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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of Haggart,21 the Surrogate's Court, Chautauqua County, determined
whether the decedent's former wife was entitled to apply the tventy-
year period to her claim against his estate arising out of support pay-
ments, rather than the six-year residuary statute of limitations
prescribed in CPLR 213(1).22
The plaintiff had obtained a number of court orders requiring
the decedent to pay varying amounts for the support of herself and her
children. The court distinguished between a claim based on a separa-
tion agreement and one due under a final decree of a court. The
former, being contractual, is governed by the six-year statute of limita-
tions;23 the latter is considered a money judgment,24 imposing a
liability on one spouse to pay a sum certain to the other,25 and thus
subject to the twenty-year time limit.
This sound decision clarifies that court-ordered support payments
are judgment debts, and thus gives greater protection to a spouse en-
titled to such monies.
ARTICLE 3- -JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 301: Parent corporation found to be doing business in New
York on agency theory.
Jurisdiction may be exercised over a nondomiciliary parent
corporation on the basis of its subsidiary's activities within the state
if the subsidiary is deemed for jurisdictional purposes either (1) a mere
department of the parent, or (2) the parent's agent performing "all
the business which [the parent] could do were it here by its own
officials." 2 Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co.27 illustrates the
prerequisites to a finding of the latter relationship.
In Sunrise Toyota, the publicly-owned Japanese Toyota manu-
facturing (Factory) and distributing (Sales) companies jointly and
2171 Misc. 2d 157, 335 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sur. Ct. Chautauqua County 1972).
22 CPLR 213(1) establishes a six-year statute of limitations for actions for which no
limitation is specifically fixed by law.
23 See Haimes v. Schonwit, 268 App. Div. 652, 52 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 295
N.Y. 577, 64 N.E.2d 283 (1945); Winer v. Ginsburg, 35 Misc. 2d 1054, 231 N.Y.S.2d 622
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962); Estate of Philippe, 31 Misc. 2d 193, 220 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1961), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 600, 198 N.E.2d 263, 248 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1964).
24 CPLR 105(n) defines a money judgment as "a judgment, or any part thereof, for
a sum of money or directing the payment of a sum of money."
25See In re Bassford's Will, 91 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sur Ct. Westchester County 1949),
af'd mei., 277 App. Div. 1128, 101 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dep't 1950).
26 See, e.g., Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y..2d 653 (1972),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 768, 772 (1972).
2755 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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wholly owned the United States importer (Importer), a California
corporation, which, in turn, wholly owned the United States distribu-
tor (Distributor), also a California corporation. Importer took title to
the cars it purchased from Sales at a Japanese port of departure. Dis-
tributor allocated the vehicles in the United States to either indepen-
dent wholesale distributors or directly to franchised independent
dealers. In addition, Distributor contracted with independent dealers
in New York for service and sale of the cars, and pursuant thereto,
Distributor's representative entered New York to consult each dealer
monthly about service or sales problems. Distributor received directions
on important matters from Factory and Sales, whose Joint 1969 Annual
Report depicted this sales system as an integrated network. Importer
shared the same corporate name as parent Sales except that "U.S.A."
was added to Importer's tide, and it was listed in the Manhattan tele-
phone directory without the suffix. 28
Finding these facts insufficient to establish that the subsidiaries
were mere departments of the Toyota parents, 29 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Factory
and Sales "created wholly-owned subsidiaries solely to serve their
interests"8° and thus were subject to New York jurisdictions' on the
agency theory elucidated in Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International,
Inc 2
In Frummer, Hilton Reservation Service, a partly-owned 3 New
York affiliate of Hilton Hotels International, Inc., a British corpora-
tion, operating on a nonprofit basis, performed public relations and
reservations acceptance and confirmation services here for its parent,
International. Stating that Reservation "does all the business which
[International] could do were it here by its own officials," 34 the Court
of Appeals held that International was doing business in New York
through the activities of its agent, Reservation.
In so sustaining jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary parent, the
28 Although this fact was not litigated, the court took judicial notice of it. Id. at
526 n.3.
29 Id. at 528.
S0 Id. at 530.
3l Id. at 528.
32 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 US. 923 (1967),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 436, 444 (1968).
83 International, a Delaware corporation, had complete stock ownership of the
British corporate defendant except for one share. It, in turn, was partly owned by Hilton
Hotels Corporation, a Delaware corporation. International and Hilton Hotels Corpora-
tion jointly owned Hilton Credit Corporation. Reservation was a branch of this latter
Hilton affiliate. Id. at 540, 227 N.EZd at 855-56, 281 N.YS.2d at 47 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
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Sunrise Toyota court distinguished Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG,35
wherein the Court of Appeals unanimously held that the German
parent was not subject to New York jurisdiction on the basis of its
,subsidiary's activities on either an agency or department theory. In
Delagi, the American Volkswagen distributor was a publicly-owned
franchise whose only significant contact with the German manufacturer
was through its purchase of cars at dockside from the American im-
porter, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the manufacturer, which was not
doing business here. In denying jurisdiction, the Court stated that
"[w]here, as here, there exists [sic] truly separate corporate entities,
not commonly owned, a valid inference of agency cannot be sus-
tained."6
The instant court's characterization of the relationship between
the Japanese parents and their American subsidiaries as one of agency
is in accord with Frummer and Delagi. Moreover, it fairly places
responsibility on the nondomiciliary parents to defend litigation stem-
ming from the purposeful use of the state by their subsidiaries which
they planned and at least partially controlled.
CPLR 305(b): Court is powerless to enter default judgment where
notice served with summons fails to state object of action.
Although an action is commenced by the service of a summons,87
a judgment may not be entered against a defaulting defendant unless
service of either a complaint or a CPLR 305(b) or 316(a) notice is also
proved.8 In the absence of such proof, a court is without jurisdiction
to enter a default judgment. 9 When a plaintiff attempts to serve a
summons and notice pursuant to CPLR 305(b), but his notice fails
to meet the statutory requirements, what are the jurisdictional conse-
quences?
In Arden v. Loew's Hotels, Inc.,40 the plaintiff commenced a per-
sonal injury action by service of a summons containing a notice stating
the amount of damages sought, but not the nature of the claim. The
notice was, therefore, defective in that, while it set forth the relief
sought, it failed to state the object of the action as required by CPLR
305(b).41 Finding that the defendant was aware of the nature and the
35 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
SO Id. at 431, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
37 CPLR 304.
38 CPLR 3215(e).
3 9 See McDeimott v. Hoenig, 32 App. Div. 2d 838, 302 N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1968)
(mer.); Malone v. Citarella, 7 App. Div. 2d 871, 182 N.Y.S.2d 200 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.).
40 40 App. Div. 2d 894, 337 N.Y.S.2d 669 (3d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
41 CPLR 305(b) provides in pertinent part:
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